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CHANGING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR THROUGH
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
DAVID W. CASE*
If we do not change our direction, we are likely to end up
where we are headed.'
INTRODUCTION
Calls are universal among scholars and policy analysts for in-
novation in creation and implementation of American environmental
regulatory policy. Traditional regulatory approaches to controlling pol-
lution are often pejoratively labeled as "command-and-control."2 Since
the early 1970s, however, these approaches are credited with substantial,
yet critically limited, successes in reducing the harmful environmental
impacts of industrial activity.' Laudable improvements have occurred in
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law.
B.A. 1985, J.D. 1988, University of Mississippi; LL.M. 1993, Columbia University; Ph.D.
2004, Vanderbilt University. This Article is based on a presentation at the William &
Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review's Symposium "Corporate Governance and
Environmental Best Practices" held at the William & Mary Law School in February 2006.
' Chinese Proverb.
2
"The phrase 'command-and-control' has taken on a life of its own in the environmental
literature." David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regu-
lation:A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379,380 (2005) [hereinafter
Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting]. But disagreement over precise definitions of
the phrase and its common overuse as a "pejorative catchall for any and all criticisms of
environmental regulation" substantially limit its value. Kathryn Harrison, Talking With
the Donkey: Cooperative Approaches to Environmental Protection, 2 J. INDUST. ECOLOGY
51, 53 (1999). For additional discussion of the contextual problems with the phrase
"command-and-control," see Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra at 380 n.2.
' J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Management-Is It Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. ScI. &
TECH. 21, 21 (2005) ("Even the most conservative cost-benefit analyses confirm that
many of these [environmental prescriptive regulation] initiatives were smashing
successes."); J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 55-56, 270-275 (1998) (summarizing progress in
reducing pollution in the United States through use of regulatory standards between
1970 and 1997); Paula C. Murray, Inching Toward Environmental Regulatory
Reform-ISO 14000: Much Ado About Nothing Or a Reinvention Tool?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J.
35, 35 (1999) (describing the American environmental regulatory system as having been
"somewhat successful"); Jesse Ratcliffe, Comment, Reenvisioning the Risk Bubble:
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controlling readily identifiable and relatively discrete sources of harm,
such as land-based waste disposal and industrial "end-of-the-pipe" air
emissions and discharges into water systems.4 There is, however, consid-
erable debate over the efficiency of command-and-control approaches and
whether similar gains could have been obtained through alternative
regulatory strategies at far less cost.5
Moreover, many critical environmental protection problems con-
tinue to flourish, such as non-point source water pollution, emissions
affecting climate change, wasteful consumption of natural resources, and
risks posed by the manufacture and use of toxic chemicals.6 Critics
charge that these and other difficult challenges fall largely outside of or
are not particularly amenable to traditional regulatory control.7 J.B.
Ruhl describes the future challenges of environmental protection as
"problems of unwieldy dimensions and intractable causes" which are
"excruciatingly hard for researchers to understand, and thus even harder
for law to wrestle under control."' Notwithstanding the substantial
difficulty inherent in the task, policymakers must strive to develop and
Utilizing a System of Intra-Firm Risk Trading for Environmental Protection, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1779, 1781 (2004) (acknowledging the "remarkable success" of environmental
regulation of industry over the past thirty years, especially in the areas of air, water and
hazardous waste); Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New
Framework to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803,814-
17 (1996-97) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Targets in Environmental Law] (describing
"substantial progress" on "first generation" air and water quality problems controlled
by American environmental regulatory system).
4 Ruhl, supra note 3, at 21 (discussing how "'command-and-control' regulation has picked
the low-hanging fruit ... [by targeting] discrete, easily identified sources of environ-
mental harm"); Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Management Systems
and the New Policy Agenda, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 1, 1 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash
eds., 2001) [hereinafter Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda]; Michael P.
Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New
Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515,526 (2004) [hereinafter Vandenbergh,
New Era of Environmental Law] ("Advocates of command and control have pointed out
that, despite substantial increases in economic activity, command and control regulations
have achieved remarkable reductions in emissions over the last thirty years, particularly
from BAT [best available technology] controls on large industrial point sources and
controls on automobile tailpipe emissions.").
' See Ruhl, supra note 3, at 21 n.1.
' See DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note 3, at 270-76; see also Ruhl, supra note 3, at 22.
7 See Ruhl, supra note 3, at 22-28; see also Vandenbergh, Targets In Environmental Law,
supra note 3, at 811-12.
8 See Ruhl, supra note 3, at 22-24.
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implement policy tools capable of effectively and efficiently dealing with
such problems.9
This Article examines one potential policy tool that has received
considerable recent positive attention among scholars and researchers:
the environmental management system ("EMS"). An EMS is a formal set
of internal procedures and policies that create a framework for an orga-
nization to identify, minimize, and manage environmental impacts,
ensure compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations,
and reduce wasteful uses of natural resources.' This Article considers
EMSs within the context of the search for new strategies to supplement
and improve the ability of the existing regulatory regime to control the
harmful environmental impacts of industrial activity. Commentators
routinely evaluate EMSs using two differing frameworks: (1) market-
based approaches to environmental policy reform (through creation of
incentives to encourage voluntary adoption of EMSs by firms), and (2) a
more direct regulatory approach that would mandate regulated parties
to adopt an EMS." Under either framework, the ultimate objective is more
9 Id. at 25 n.7.
10 Richard N.L. Andrews et al., Environmental Management Systems: History, Theory,
and Implementation Research, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS?, supra note 4, at 31, 32; Nicole Darnall
et al., ISO 14001: Greening Management Systems, in GREENER MANUFACTURING AND
OPERATIONS: FROM DESIGN TO DELIVERY AND BACK 178, 178 (J. Sarkis ed., 2001)
[hereinafter Darnall et. al., Greening Management Systems]. See also Timothy F. Malloy,
Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 492-93 (2003) ("[Aln EMS
is a formal, integrated set of organizational routines (consisting of rules, procedures,
authority structures and resource allocations) designed to establish goals, collect infor-
mation, make decisions and improve performance, with particular emphasis on securing
sustained compliance with environmental law."); Jennifer Nash & John R. Ehrenfeld,
Factors That Shape EMS Outcomes in Firms, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS?, supra note 4, at 61,62
("EMSs are formal structures of rules and resources that managers adopt to establish
organizational routines that help achieve corporate environmental goals.").
" Compare Murray, supra note 3, at 39 (noting that as EMSs "are private, voluntary
standards, the hope is that market forces will lead to widespread adoption"), with Paulette
L. Stenzel, Can the ISO 14000 Series Environmental Management Standards Provide a
Viable Alternative to Government Regulation?, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 237, 238-39 (2000)
(contrasting the"market-driven approach" to the interface between EMSs and environmental
regulation with EMS standards as a "viable alternative or supplement to government
regulation"). See also Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Management-Based Strategies for
Improving Private-Sector Environmental Performance, 36 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.)
10,003, at 10,006 (2006) [hereinafter Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies]
(distinguishing between management-based regulatory strategies that mandate adoption of
EMSs and those that create incentives to encourage voluntary adoption).
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flexible and effective methods of obtaining greater environmental pro-
tection at a lower cost to the government and the regulated community.
12
A"management-based" regulatory strategy that would encourage
or mandate adoption of formal EMSs by firms is a significant depar-
ture from the "performance-based and technology-based regulatory
strategies" which have been the hallmarks of the traditional American
approach to environmental protection policy. 13 The fundamental premise
of a "management-based" regulatory strategy is that implementation of
a formalized management system will produce changes in corporate
organization, culture, and procedures that will result in environmental
performance improvements not achievable solely through traditional
regulatory approaches.' 4 After "a facility implements its EMS, in theory,
it will not only be in conformance with all [applicable] environmental
regulations, but it may also surpass the regulatory standards for many
environmentally regulated activities, and may identify opportunities for
reducing non-regulated environmental impacts of its activities as well." 5
A regulatory strategy to encourage or mandate adoption of EMSs seeks
to change the behavior of organizations through the use of basic manage-
ment practices in order to "align their actions and outcomes with broader
[environmental protection] objectives."' 6
Part I of this Article discusses the importance of corporate
behavioral change as an objective of environmental regulatory policy.
Part II examines factors which have encouraged the evolution and
substantial growth of the existing voluntary regime of EMS adoption by
many organizations, especially large industry standard setters. Part II
also discusses the leading EMS standards and guidelines as well as the
basic components and principles underlying formal EMSs. Part III
2 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 100-R-00-020, INNOVATION AT THE ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: A DECADE OF PROGRESS 1 (2000) (describing innovative
environmental policy tools and strategies developed during the 1990s intended to supple-
ment regulatory programs and lead "to real environmental improvements and real
reductions in costs").
"3 Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,003-04. For
additional discussion of "management-based" environmental regulatory strategies, see
LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006).
14 Andrews et al., supra note 10, at 35-43.
5Nicole Darnall et al., Environmental Management Systems: Opportunities for Improved
Environmental and Business Strategy?, ENVTL. QUALITY MGMT., Spring 2000, at 1, 2
[hereinafter Darnall et al., Environmental Management Systems].
16 Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,005.
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focuses on linkages between formal EMSs and public environmental in-
formation disclosure mechanisms as a potential means of driving desir-
able corporate environmental behavioral change. This Article concludes
with a brief discussion of the potential role for environmental protection
policies that encourage or mandate formal EMS adoption within the
existing environmental regulatory regime.
I. CORPORATE BEHAVIORAL CHANGE AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY OBJECTIVE
The search for innovative alternatives to traditional environmental
regulatory approaches is, in large part, an effort to discover more effective
ways of modifying corporate behavior." Indeed, at its core, environmental
law is an "activist" form of governmental regulation." As Donald Elliot
has observed, "[tihe purpose of law in the activist mode is to change the
norms and behavior of a community or subcommunity.""9
Corporate governance oforganizational environmental behavior has
been largely inadequate to attain desired levels of environmental protec-
tion.2° American corporate law generally fails to promote environmental
protection goals and is, at best, "environmental-neutral."2' As a result, both
external (federal and state governments and their regulatory agencies or
institutional shareholders and investors) and internal (corporate commu-
nity efforts at self-improvement) influences on corporate governance
17 See Mitchell F. Crusto, Green Business: Should We Revoke Corporate Charters for
Environmental Violations?, 63 LA. L. REV. 175 (2003) [hereinafter Crusto, Green Business]
(examining a strategic corporate environmental management approach as a means to
effectuate positive change in corporate environmental behavior); see also David W. Case,
The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation, 31 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,773 (2001) [hereinafter Case, Environmental Information as Regu-
lation) (surveying economic and legal theories underlying informational regulation as a
means of generating positive changes in firm environmental behavior and performance).
' E. Donald Elliott, Environmental TQM: Anatomy of a Pollution Control Program that
Works!, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1840, 1840 (1994).
19 Id.
20 See Mitchell F. Crusto, Endangered Green Reports: "Cumulative Materiality" in
Corporate Environmental Disclosure After Sarbanes-Oxley, 42 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 483,
484, 490-92 (2005) [hereinafter Crusto, Endangered Green Reports]; Crusto, Green
Business, supra note 17, at 192.
21 Crusto, Green Business, supra note 17, at 183. See also Crusto, Endangered Green
Reports, supra note 20, at 490-92; Crusto, Green Business, supra note 17, at 195 ("[Wlhen
it comes to promoting environmental protection, U.S. corporate law apparently provides
little to no incentives.").
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endeavor in numerous direct and indirect ways to change corporate
environmental behavior.22 However, such efforts, whether through direct
regulatory oversight of corporate environmental behavior, market-based
regulatory strategies, or self-regulatory initiatives, have fallen well short
of the level of behavioral change necessary to achieve critical environmental
protection goals.'
Evidence of the failure of traditional regulatory approaches to in-
duce sufficient corporate environmental behavioral change is abundant.
Corporate noncompliance with regulatory requirements is described as
"pervasive." " Surveys of corporate general counsel and environmental
lawyers representing business reflect a widespread belief that a sub-
stantial number of their clients are not in compliance with environ-
mental laws.25 More importantly, a growing body of empirical evidence
demonstrates consistent and disturbing patterns of "significant" noncom-
pliance by firms with environmental statutes and regulations.26 David
Spence cautions, however, that "there are relatively few studies address-
ing this question in a systematic way, perhaps because compliance rates
" See Crusto, Green Business, supra note 17, at 222-40 (surveying attempts by external
and internal corporate constituents to change corporate environmental behavior).
' Id. at 221-22; Crusto, Endangered Green Reports, supra note 20, at 490-93. See also
DAVIES & MAZUREK, supra note 3, at 39-48 (summarizing the duties of environmental
regulatory programs as divided between state and federal agencies).
24 Malloy, supra note 10, at 452.
25 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 792 (2003) (describing a survey
of environmental lawyers representing business clients that reported that "a startling
number of respondents said they believe their clients [achieved full compliance with
environmental regulations] less than two-thirds of the time."); Marianne Lavelle,
Environment Vise: Law, Compliance Companies Staff Up and Struggle to Stay Ahead of
the Green Machine, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1993, at S1-2 (describing a national survey of
corporate general counsel that found that two-thirds admit that their employers violated
federal or state environmental laws at least some time within previous year).26 See JOHN COEQUYT ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, ABOVE THE LAW: How
CALIFORNIA'S MAJOR AIR POLLUTERS GET AWAY WITH IT (1999) (examining rates of
noncompliance with Clean Air Act requirements among major California facilities in five
industrial sectors); Joel A. Mintz, Scrutinizing Environmental Enforcement: A Comment
on a Recent Discussion at the AALS, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,639, at 10,640
(2000), available at http://www.elr.info/ articlesvo30/30.10639.cfm (discussing studies
of noncompliance under the Clean Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
and the Clean Air Act); David Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking
the Role of Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 966-67
(2001) (summarizing evidence of "significant" incidence of noncompliance reflected in
studies involving Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, RCRA and EPCRA).
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are so difficult to measure."27 Another problem with assessing environ-
mental regulatory compliance rates may be a substantial lack of avail-
able data on federal and state enforcement efforts.28
The perception that federal and state regimes' enforcement of
environmental laws is "weak and sporadic" exacerbates the problem of
corporate regulatory noncompliance.29 No matter the regulatory strategy
utilized, effective enforcement mechanisms are required to achieve de-
sired levels of change in corporate environmental behavior.3 ° Indeed,
"enforcement is the centerpiece of regulation, the visible hand of the
state reaching into society to correct wrongs."3' Despite the critical im-
portance of compliance enforcement in inducing desired modification of
corporate environmental behavior, numerous constraints on its potential
effectiveness exist.32 Resource limitations may be the most significant
problem hindering effective enforcement efforts. Congress has histori-
cally provided inadequate and unrealistic budgets to meet the over-
whelming statutory mandates for environmental regulators.33
27 Spence, supra note 26, at 966.
' See David Markell, "Slack" in the Administrative State and its Implications for
Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 28-43 (2005) (describing
insufficiency of public information on the full extent and nature of EPA and state
enforcement activities).
' See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal
System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United
States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552,1554(1995) (quoting Hearing
on S. 1081 Before the Subcomm. On Environmental Protection of the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong., 689 (1991) (statement of Richard L. Hembra,
Director, Environmental Issues, General Accounting Office)) (using enforcement ofwater
quality standards as an example of the failure of the federal and state regulatory regime).
30 Robert H. Cutting et al., Enforcement Data: A Tool for Environmental Management,
36 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,060, at 10,060 (2006).3 1 PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLLUTION
251 (1990).
32 Cutting et al., supra note 30, at 10,061 ("Despite the critical role compliance enforce-
ment plays in the protection of environmental quality, enforcement components within
regulatory agencies are controversial, politically manipulated, and subject to limitations
such as budget, staffing, and technology that impede the complete compliance monitoring
of regulated polluters.").
31 See NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., SETTING PRIORITIES, GETTING RESULTS: A NEW
DIRECTION FOR EPA 8 (1995) ("EPA is sometimes ineffective, in part, because Congress
has frequently set impossible deadlines and unrealistic expectations, given the agency's
budget."); Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal
Environmental Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 329 ("EPA has consis-
tently received a level of funding far lower than the amount required to provide the
agency with even a small chance of moderate success in implementing its statutory
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Environmental policymaking is created and implemented within
a fiercely combative political arena.34 The politicization of enforcement
budgets also has a negative impact on compliance monitoring and en-
forcement.35 Evenwhen not a result of partisan politics, historically in-
sufficient budget allocations for enforcement on both federal and state
levels often decrease further in the face of lean economic times.36 This
distressing combination of overwhelming statutory mandates and grossly
insufficient resources devoted to meeting them compels two intuitive con-
clusions. First, "[g] overnment enforcement will never catch a big fraction
of violations."37 As David Hodas has observed:
Unfortunately, our system of public environmental enforce-
ment is more fragile and overwhelmed than most people
realize. Annual enforcement accomplishment reports praise
government's effectiveness in enforcing the law. But, there
mandates."); Rena I. Steinzor & William F. Piermattei, Reinventing Environmental
Regulation Via the Government Performance and Results Act: Where's the Money?, 28
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,563, at 10,564 (1998) (describing the EPA's strategic
planning and budgeting process by which the agency "deploys its grossly inadequate
resources to implement its overwhelming statutory mandates").
' See David W. Case, The EPA's Environmental Stewardship Initiative: Attempting to
Revitalize a Floundering Regulatory Reform Agenda, 50 EMORY L.J. 1, 16-26 (2001)
[hereinafter Case, Regulatory Reform] (discussing the adversarial political context of
environmental policy creation and implementation).
35 See Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 23-25; Joel A. Mintz, "Neither the Best
of Times Nor the Worst of Times": EPA Enforcement During the Clinton Administration,
35 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,390, at 10,398-01 (2005) [hereinafter Mintz,
Neither the Best of Times] (describing EPA budget conflict during the "Gingrich
Revolution" of the 104th Congress); Joel A. Mintz, "Treading Water". A Preliminary
Assessment of EPA Enforcement During the Bush If Administration, 34 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,912, at 10,914,10,920-21 (2004) [hereinafter Mintz, Treading Water]
(describing politicization of EPA enforcement efforts under the Administration of
President George W. Bush).
36 See Mintz, Neither the Best of Times, supra note 35, at 10,406 (describing"cumulatively
significant" annual budget cuts made in funds available for enforcement during the
Clinton Administration); Mintz, Treading Water, supra note 35, at 10,921, 10,924-25
(discussing the trend of continuing budget decreases for enforcement efforts during the
Bush Administration); R. Steven Brown, Coping with the Budget Crunch: When the Axe
Falls-How State Environmental Agencies Deal with Budget Cuts, ECOSTATEs, Winter
2002, at 16-19 (surveying state environmental agency experiences and responses to
budget cuts caused by economic slowdowns).
"' Donald A. Carr & William L. Thomas, Devising a Compliance Strategy Under the ISO
14000 International Environmental Management Standards, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 85,
98 (1997).
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is less than meets the eye to claims that the law is being
effectively enforced. Despite the many enforcement suc-
cess stories reported by the government, the number ofvio-
lations overwhelm the enforcement capacity of both the
federal and state governments.38
Second, achievement of environmental regulatory goals is substantially
dependent on voluntary compliance behavior by corporate environmental
actors.39
Innovative, alternative approaches for inducing change in cor-
porate environmental behavior are also necessary because the existing
regulatory system "remains vastly under-inclusive, both in the types of
harm it regulates and in the sources of harm it regulates."4" Many critical
problems fall outside the effective control of traditional environmental
regulation.41 Not all such problems are attributable solely to corporate or
industrial activity.42 However, this corporate and industrial behavior
substantially impacts such under- or non-regulated concerns as global
climate change, non-point source water pollution, risks related to manu-
facture and use of toxic chemicals, and wasteful consumption of natural
resources and energy supplies.' Experimentation over the last two de-
cades with alternative regulatory reform or "reinvention " " programs has
sought to induce "beyond compliance"45 behavior by organizations.4" The
3 Hodas, supra note 29, at 1,558-60 (internal citations omitted). For a recent overview
of EPA enforcement methods and principles, see Markell, supra note 28, at 47-58.
s Hodas, supra note 29, at 1,556-57.
4o Ratcliffe, supra note 3, at 1,784; Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 28.
41 See Ratcliffe, supra note 3, at 1,784-85 (describing examples of unregulated environ-
mental harms); Vandenbergh, Targets in Environmental Law, supra note 3, at 818-19
(stating that "second generation problems are more difficult to address through tradi-
tional command and control regulations than many of the first generation problems").
42 See Vandenbergh, New Era of Environmental Law, supra note 4, at 533-37.
Vandenbergh discusses non-industrial sources as "a large and growing proportion of the
remaining environmental harms." Id. at 534.
"Ratcliffe, supra note 3, at 1,784-85. See generally Vandenbergh, Targets in Environ-
mental Law, supra note 3, at 818-24.
"Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 40.
45 Id. at 64.46 Id. at 40-46, 64-87 (reviewing several Clinton-era reinvention initiatives designed to
experiment with alternative approaches to traditional environmental regulation);
Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA to Conform with
the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 15-25 (1998); David B.
Spence & Lekha Gopalakrishnan, Bargaining Theory and Regulatory Reform: The
Political Logic of Inefficient Regulation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 599, 612-19 (2000).
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effort to encourage organizations to achieve environmental performance
that exceeds the minimum requirements of environmental law and regu-
lation is in significant part an indirect means of addressing the under-
inclusiveness problem of the existing regulatory regime.
Scholars debate whether regulatory policy can influence firms to
engage in environmental performance behavior that exceeds the mini-
mum requirements of existing regulation.47 Encouraging such "beyond
compliance" corporate environmental behavior is an important principle
underlying the goal of "sustainable development," a concept first articu-
lated by the United Nations' World Commission on the Environment and
Development in 1987.8 The precise meaning of "sustainable develop-
ment" or the related term "sustainability" is the subject of some disagree-
ment.4" Generally, the concept concerns three dimensions of corporate
behavior: environmental, social, and economic.5 ° The World Commission
describes "sustainable development as development that 'meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs.'""l Similarly, the President's Council on Sustainable
Development (created by President Clinton in 1993) defines sustainable
development as "ensuring that future generations have equivalent eco-
nomic opportunities and quality of life enjoyed by the current generation
through national policies that consider economic, environmental, and
social equity interests in combination."52
47 See Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 8-9. For a review of literature on beyond
compliance environmental regulatory behavior and analysis of internal and external
variables motivating corporate environmental behavior, see NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL.,
SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND ENVIRONMENT 20-40 (2003). For a review
of scholarly literature on the relationship of corporate behavior to environmental regu-
latory policy in the fields of economics, law and economics, sociology, and public policy,
see Mark A. Cohen, Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Policy, in THE
INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 1999/2000: A
SURVEY OF CURRENT ISSUES 44 (Henk Folmer & Tom Tietenberg eds., 1999).
8 Stenzel, supra note 11, at 237.
4 See Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 390 n.51.
50Id.5 1 Stenzel, supra note 11, at 237 (quoting WORLD COMM. ON ENV'TAND DEV., OUR COMMON
FUTURE 8 (1987)).
52 Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 11; THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON
SUSTAINABLE DEv., SUSTAINABLE AMERICA: A NEW CONSENSUS FOR PROSPERITY,
OPPORTUNITY, AND A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT FOR THE FUTURE i-ii (1996).
[Vol. 31:75
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Public pressure for corporate actors to make sustainability a core
value and fundamental business goal escalated rapidly during the 1990s."3
Advocates argue that regulatory policies that emphasize environmental
management frameworks will induce the internalization of environmental
values and social norms, and will in turn bring about corporate behavior
that facilitates sustainability and increased environmental protection. 4
Many doubt that regulatory policy can effectuate internalization of social
norms and "beyond compliance" corporate behavior.55 Nonetheless, sup-
porters of EMS adoption "as a means for regulatory innovation" tout the
potential of such a strategy to do just that. 6 Indeed, a primary motivation
for design of leading EMS standards initiatives is to promote the goal of
sustainable development.57 Today's global industrial environmental
threats58 warrant a stronger focus on potential links between corporate
environmental behavior and management-based regulatory strategies.
' See Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 11-16 (discussing reports from the
President's Council on Sustainable Development and the Enterprise for the Environment
recommending a national action strategy to promote sustainable development as a
corporate values-driven approach to environmental protection); see also Stenzel, supra
note 11, at 252-53.
4 Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 13. For a discussion of sustainable develop-
ment within the context of "good governance, the rule of law, and compliance," see
Durwood Zaelke et al., What Reason Demands: Making Law Work for Sustainable
Development, in 1 MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE & SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 29, 30 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 2005).
" Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 10. See also Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing
Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22
HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 162-64 (1998) (expressing doubt that government policy can
"duplicate the circumstances" that produce examples of corporate internalization of
environmental values and ethics).
" Keith Pezzoli, Environmental Management Systems (EMSS) and Regulatory
Innovation, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 335, 354 (2000). Andrews et al., supra note 10, at 31
("Advocates argue that when implemented, EMSs have the potential not only to improve
compliance with environmental regulations but also to refocus the organization's
attention beyond compliance toward a dynamic, continual process of improvement in
environmental and economic performance.").
" Stenzel, supra note 11, at 238, 252; W. GARY WILSON & DENNIS R. SASSEVILLE,
SUSTAINING ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SUCCESS: BEST BUSINESS PRACTICES FROM
INDUSTRY LEADERS 10 (1999); Andrews et al., supra note 10, at 41.
s See, e.g., Keith Bradsher & David Barboza, Pollution From Chinese Coal Casts Shadow
Around Globe, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at 1 (discussing global effects of pollution
produced by Chinese coal plants and coal-burning factories).
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE VOLUNTARY REGIME OF FORMAL
EMS ADOPTION
An EMS is an organized, systemic process established to manage,
control and minimize the environmental impact and effects of an organi-
zation's activities and operations. 9 More simply, an "EMS is . . . the
application of well-accepted business principles to environmental pro-
tection."" In varying degrees of scale and quality, organizations have
applied basic management principles to manage and control potential en-
vironmental liabilities and risks since the earliest days of governmental
environmental regulation.6' By necessity, firms eventually began to inte-
grate individualized design and implementation of systems to manage
environmental issues faced by the organization into existing internal
management systems.62 Leading examples of such "firm-structured
EMSs" include those developed in the mid to late 1980s by the Polaroid
Corporation and the Robbins Company to reduce natural resource and
chemical use and waste in their operations.
Although many propose the use of EMSs as the foundation for
alternatives to traditional environmental regulation, government regu-
lation does not mandate EMS implementation.' Nonetheless, a steadily
increasing number of firms are voluntarily implementing formal EMSs
to manage environmental issues.65 Significantly, much of the momentum
towards the widespread adoption of voluntary, formal EMSs has been
industry-driven.66
59 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-305-R-99-001, EPAICMA ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS
PILOT PROJECT: AN INDUSTRY SURVEY 27 (1999).6 Christopher L. Bell, The ISO 14001 Environmental Management System Standard: A
Modest Perspective, 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law. Inst.) 10,622, at 10,623 (1997) [herein-
after Bell, Modest Perspective].
1 See id.; see also David Morrow & Dennis Rondinelli,Adopting Corporate Environmental
Management Systems: Motivations and Results of ISO 14001 and EMAS Certification,
20 EUR. MGMT. J. 159, 161 (2002).
62 Bell, Modest Perspective, supra note 60, at 10,622.
63 Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 10, at 62-64.
6 4 See DEPT. OF PUB. POL'Y, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
SYSTEMS: Do THEY IMPROVE PERFORMANCE, NATIONAL DATABASE ON ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS PROJECT FINAL REPORT 1 (2003) [hereinafter NDEMS FINAL
REPORT]; Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 73.
65 NDEMS FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 1.
' Indeed, since the early 1990s, a primarily industry-driven movement to develop formal-
ized EMS standards and requirements has been underway. See Bell, Modest Perspective,
supra note 60, at 10,623 (noting that the first formal EMS standards were the "British
Standards Institute's BS 7750 EMS standard in 1992, or the European Union's
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In the early 1990s, a number of business-oriented, non-govern-
mental organizations sought to influence the environmental behavior of
business organizations.67 These non-governmental organizations provided
early momentum to the standardization movement by creating guide-
lines for the development of EMSs.6" Particularly celebrated examples
include environmental management principles and guidelines published
by the Global Environmental Management Initiative ("GEMI"), the
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies ("CERES"), and
the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC").69 Public and social pres-
sures on this issue influenced these business-oriented groups. Environ-
mental advocacy groups such as Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, the Natural
Resources Defense Council and others encouraged these organizations
to develop environmental management guidelines.7 °
By 2000, seven trade associations had developed codes of envi-
ronmental management practices and required their members to adopt
these practices.71 Notable trade-association EMS initiatives and guidance
documents include the American Chemistry Counsel's "Responsible Care"
program and the American Petroleum Institute's Strategies for Today's
Environmental Partnership program. 2 The Responsible Care initiative
is considered "a direct attempt by U.S. chemical manufacturers to insti-
tutionalize new norms of behavior for participants."7" Other trade asso-
ciations adopting similar EMS guidelines include those for chemical
distribution, forestry and textile industries.74
By far, however, the most well known and influential standard-
ization initiative is ISO 14001, "the voluntary international EMS stand-
ard [first] published by the Geneva-based International Organization for
Environmental Management and Audit Regulation (EMAR) and Environmental
Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), both of which were published in 1993").
67 See JOHN VOORHEES & ROBERT A. WOELLNER, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RISK
MANAGEMENT: ISO 14000AND THE SYSTEMS APPROACH 11-24(1998); Stenzel,supra note 11,
at 250.6 8 VOORHEES & WOELLNER, supra note 67, at 11-24. Stenzel, supra note 11, at 250.
6 9 See VASANTHAKUMAR N. BHAT, TOTAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: AN ISO
14000 APPROACH 58-62 (1998); Bell, Modest Perspective, supra note 60, at 10,623 n.4;
Crusto, Green Business, supra note 17, at 235-37; Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental
Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1,227, 1,287-89 (1995); Stenzel, supra note 11, at 249-50.
70 Stenzel, supra note 11, at 249.
71 Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 10, at 64-65. See also BRAT, supra note 69, at 57-69.
72 BHAT, supra note 69, at 62-69; Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 70; Nash &
Ehrenfeld, supra note 10, at 64-66.
7' Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 10, at 64.74 Id. at 65.
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Standardization ("ISO") in 1996.""s The initial objective underlying publi-
cation of ISO 14001 was to create a single, international EMS standard
applicable to organizations of all types and sizes. 76 Early predictions that
ISO 14001 would become the leading voluntary EMS standard around
the globe have proven accurate.77 From 1996 to the end of 2001, at least
1,645 United States businesses and firms "were registered as conform-
ing to this standard."7 ' At that time, United States registrations were
increasing at a rate exceeding fifty percent per year.79 By the end of
2001, "an estimated 36,765 organizations were registered" worldwide.8 °
By the end of 2004, the estimated number of worldwide ISO 14001 regis-
trations had increased to 90,569.1 This number includes an estimated
4,759 businesses and firms in the United States. 2
ISO 14001 was preceded by the European Union's ("EU") EMS
standard for the continent, promulgated as part of the EU's Eco-Manage-
ment and Audit Scheme ("EMAS") regulation in 1993.3 Although
originally intended to be mandatory, the EMAS regulation is a voluntary
registration system "for companies to adopt standard procedures for
environmental management, auditing, and reporting" in exchange for
limited regulatory controls.' The original EMAS regulation created its
own detailed EMS standard required for implementation by participating
7 Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 70.
76 See Bell, Modest Perspective, supra note 60, at 10,635.
For these predictions, see Christopher L. Bell, ISO 14001: Application of International
Environmental Management Systems Standards in the United States, 25 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,678, at 10,678 (1995) [hereinafter Bell, ISO 14001] (noting that ISO
14001 was expected eventually "to become the leading voluntary environmental manage-
ment systems standard inside and outside the United States."); Clifford Rechtschaffen,
Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental Enforcement, 71
S. CAL. L. REV. 1,181, 1,258 (1998) ('[T~he ISO 14000 environmental standards are...
predicted to become the most widely accepted global environmental standards and a
condition of doing business with a number of countries and corporations.").
76 NDEMS FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at ES-1.79 Id.
80 Id.
8
' ISO CENT. SECRETARIAT, THE ISO SuRvEY-2004 4 (2005), available at http://www.iso
.org/iso/en/prods-services/otherpubs/pdf/survey2004.pdf.
82 Id.
8 S. WAYNE ROSENBAUM, ISO 14001 AND THE LAW: LEGAL GUIDE FOR THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STANDARDS 19 (1998).
' Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 402-03. See also Orts, supra
note 69, at 1,233; Rosenbaum, supra note 83 at 19.
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companies."5 However, the regulation subsequently underwent a sub-
stantive revision and the EU enacted an amended version in 2001.6 The
perception that EMAS and ISO 14001 were in direct competition contrib-
uted to low rates of participation in the EMAS program.87 "In an effort to
reverse this trend," the revised EMAS regulation establishes ISO 14001 as
the EMS "required as a condition of participation in the EMAS program." '
Notwithstanding standardization trends, significant variation in
EMSs exist because of the differences inherent in individual organiza-
tional settings and various external standards adhered to by firms. 9
Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash emphasize that EMS standards
"vary along five key dimensions," which include (1) "the ambitiousness
of the environmental objectives they require managers to establish," (2)
"the trustworthiness of the EMSs they specify," (3) "the level of monitor-
ing they call for," (4) "the type of sanctions they impose on firms that do
not measure up, and" (5) "the transparency of the EMS and of the orga-
nization's performance to the public."9 ° Although such variation may
impact their potential effectiveness, the fact that EMSs are uniquely
adaptable to the organizations that use them is considered a virtue.9
Implementing an EMS in conformance with an existing external stan-
dard, such as ISO 14001, still allows corporate managers substantial
flexibility to design and adapt a system that reflects individualized needs
and circumstances.92 Despite such potential variability, there are a
number of essential elements considered common to any formal EMS.93
The first essential component of a formal EMS is the adoption of a
written environmental policy.94 This policy is considered a public com-
munication of the organization's commitment to the EMS and the value of
the program to the organization's overall priorities and goals.95 Moreover,
" See Orts, supra note 69, at 1,299-1,301 (describing components of EMS requirements
contained in original EMAS regulation).
' Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 403.87 Id. at 403-404 n. 143.88 Id. at 404 n.143.
89 Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 4. For a basic comparison of
EMS requirements between firm structured, trade association, and standardized EMSs,
see id. at 4-7, and Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 10, at 68-70.
90 Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 5.
9
'Id. at4.92 Id. at 6-7.
93 Id.
94 Darnall et al., Environmental Management Systems, supra note 15, at 1; Andrews et
al., supra note 10, at 32.9 5 WILSON & SASSEVILLE, supra note 57, at 72.
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this policy is intended to guide and inform all activity relating to design,
implementation, and execution of the operating systems created to achieve
the objectives of the EMS.' Next, the system must establish a process to
identify the "environmental aspects and impacts of [the organization's]
operations," including the environmental regulatory requirements with
which the firm must comply.9" The system must further establish
priorities, objectives, and "targets for continuous improvement in [the
firm's] environmental performance."" These goals and objectives are
based on "the environmental aspects and impacts of [the company's]
operations" and are intended to create an organizational understanding
of what implementation of the EMS is expected to achieve. 9
Next, the EMS must "assign clear responsibilities for [system]
implementation, training, monitoring [system performance], and [for the
undertaking of] corrective actions."'0 0 Further, the system must include
a process of periodic evaluation and refinement to promote continuing
improvement in implementation of the system, and the achievement of
desired goals and objectives."0 ' Conceptually, an EMS is a perpetually
ongoing process. 2 Thus, "continuing measurement and review" must be
conducted to provide information to make such periodic adjustments as
may be necessary to achieve the desired environmental performance.' 3
These core components are often referred to as the "plan-do-check-
act" model of systemic management because of emphasis upon continuous
improvement in goal setting, implementation, monitoring, and corrective
action procedures.' 4 EMSs are founded on a "total quality management"
framework, a groundbreaking approach to managing complex organi-
zations developed by W. Edwards Deming in the 1950s.' °5 A central
" See generally Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 10, at 67.
97 WILSON & SASSEVILLE, supra note 57, at 72-73; Andrews et al., supra note 10, at 32;
Darnall et al., Environmental Management Systems, supra note 15, at 1.
9" Andrews et al., supra note 10, at 32; Darnall et al., Environmental Management
Systems, supra note 15, at 1.
99 WILSON & SASSEVILLE, supra note 57, at 73; Darnall et al., Environmental Management
Systems, supra note 15, at 1.
'0o WILSON & SASSEVILLE, supra note 57, at 75-77; Andrews et al., supra note 10, at 32;
Darnall et al., Environmental Management Systems, supra note 15, at 1-2.
101 Andrews et al., supra note 10, at 32; Darnall et al., Environmental Management
Systems, supra note 15, at 2.
102 WILSON & SASSEVILLE, supra note 57, at 77.
103 Id.
1o4 Id. at 69; Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 11; Malloy, supra
note 10, at 493.
' Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 10; Elliot, supra note 18, at 1,853.
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premise of total quality management theory is that poor system design
contributes to more problems in quality than inattentive or potentially
neglectful workers. °6 Thus, managers and all employees should strive to
continuously improve not only the company's products but also the pro-
cesses by which those products are produced.0 7 Within a total quality
management approach all employees of the organization carry out activ-
ities in pursuit of the same goals and objectives.' 8 The expected positive
effect of a total quality management approach on the company's environ-
mental performance is founded on the theory that "systematic efforts tend
to yield better results than nonsystematic or haphazard efforts." 0 9 ISO
14001 was strongly influenced by the earlier published (1987) and widely
utilized ISO 9000 series of total quality management system standards."0
Numerous factors contributed to the increase in the voluntary
adoption of EMSs."' Regulatory pressures imposed by more than three
decades of increasingly strict environmental legislation have motivated
many regulated entities to take management of environmental concerns
seriously."2 Substantial focus and effort towards regulatory compliance
"shaped the environmental management of leading firms.""' Importantly,
regulatory pressures increased demand for sophisticated environmental
management methods and environmental specialists to help firms comply
with regulatory mandates." 4 Empirical studies suggest that regulatory
pressures strongly and specifically influence the decisions of many firms
to voluntarily adopt a formal EMS." 5
106 Elliot, supra note 18, at 1,853.
107 Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 10-11; Elliot, supra note 18,
at 1,853.
" Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 11; Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra
note 10, at 67.
109 Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 10.
"
0 See Stenzel, supra note 11, at 241-42; see also WILSON & SASSEVILLE, supra note 57, at
179; Bell, ISO 14001, supra note 77, at 10,679; Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 10, at 67.
111 See Bell, Modest Perspective, supra note 60 at 10,623; Carr & Thomas, supra note 37,
at 88-95; Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 8.
112 Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 8.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 NDEMS FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 93-94, 105 (noting that of the external
drivers motivating such decisions, "traditional regulatory pressures had the greatest
influence on [study participants'] decisions to adopt an EMS'); Nicole Darnall,
Motivations for Participating in a U.S. Voluntary Environmental Initiative: The Multi-
State Working Group and EPA's EMS Pilot Program, in RESEARCH IN CORPORATE
SUSTAINABILITY 123, 138-41 (S. Sharma & M. Starik eds., 2003).
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Moreover, beginning in the mid-1980s, criminal enforcement of
environmental regulatory non-compliance became a serious concern for
corporate managers."' Criminal provisions were added to various federal
environmental statutes throughout the 1970s.117 However, the "American
phenomenon" of the "criminalization of environmental law" did not
commence in earnest until the late 1980s and into the 1990s." Indeed,
only twenty-five environmental criminal prosecutions were commenced
during the 1970s." 9 It was not until the early 1980s, after Congress
created environmental felonies, that the "use of criminal proceedings [in
environmental enforcement] became standard practice." 2 °
During the 1990s, the likelihood for both corporate and individual
criminal penalties due to regulatory non-compliance placed increased
pressure upon corporate executives and managers to "achieve and main-
tain full compliance with environmental laws."'2 ' Because many envi-
ronmental laws and regulations lack intent requirements or knowledge
standards, prosecutions of corporate officers and managers are possible in
situations where there is no specific intent to violate the law.'22 Averse to
the possibility of such consequences, corporate managers increasingly
emphasized the implementation of improved environmental management
practices and tools. 2' Related factors that encourage firms to adopt EMSs
are that prosecutorial decisions as to whether to bring a criminal enforce-
116 Carr & Thomas, supra note 37, at 88-95.
117 Jeremy Firestone, Enforcement of Pollution Laws and Regulations: An Analysis of
Forum Choice, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 105, 110 (2003).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. For a discussion of more recent environmental criminal enforcement efforts, see
Neal Shover & Aaron S. Routhe, Environmental Crime, 32 CRIME & JUST. 321 (2005).
121 Carr & Thomas, supra note 37, at 88.
122 Id. See, e.g., United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1,275, 1,283-84 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding that intent requirement for criminal conduct under the Clean Water Act means
knowingly engaging in conduct that is a regulatory violation rather than the knowing
intent to violate the regulation). The merits of applying general rather than specific
intent mens rea requirements in environmental criminal enforcement have been
vigorously debated. See also Carr & Thomas, supra note 37, at 100-02; Richard J.
Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law:
Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2,407 (1995); Lois J. Schiffer &
James F. Simon, The Reality of Prosecuting Environmental Criminals: A Response to
Professor Lazarus, 83 GEO. L.J. 2,531 (1995).
123 Carr & Thomas, supra note 37, at 85-86, 97, 102.
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ment action as well as mitigation in sentencing for corporate environmen-
tal crimes can be affected by the existence of such a management program."
Incentives for self-auditing of regulatory compliance contained in
self-policing policies of federal and state environmental agencies also
encourage firms to adopt formal EMSs.12' The Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA"), seeking to encourage firms to use environmental auditing
to assist regulatory compliance efforts, adopted its first self-policing policy
in 1986.126 This initial policy did not induce regulated entities into
significant voluntary auditing.127 As a result, the EPA adopted an ex-
panded policy statement in 1995 that provided for reductions and even
waivers of civil and criminal penalties for regulatory violations discovered
through regular environmental audits if self-reported and promptly cor-
rected.'28 The EPA adopted a further revised policy statement in 2000.129
The EPA's policy provides greater benefits to firms that vol-
untarily disclose violations discovered through "systematic discovery,"
meaning "through an environmental audit or a compliance manage-
ment system that reflects the entity's due diligence in preventing, detect-
ing and correcting violations.""O Specifically, "gravity-based penalties"
are fully waived for voluntarily disclosed regulatory violations detected
through "systematic discovery," while such penalties are only reduced by
75 percent for violations discovered through other, non-systematic means."'
"Gravity-based penalties" are the punitive portion of a civil penalty.
132
This is the "portion of a penalty over and above the economic benefit" to
"u Bell, Modest Perspective, supra note 60, at 10,623 (discussing U.S. Department of
Justice prosecutorial discretion policies and federal sentencing guidelines in the area of
environmental criminal enforcement).
... See BHAT, supra note 69, at 104-08; Carr & Thomas, supra note 37 at 106-19; Stenzel,
supra note 11, at 264-68. For a recent discussion of state adoption of environmental audit
legislation and self-policing policies, see Sarah L. Stafford, State Adoption ofEnvironmental
Audit Initiatives, 24 CONTEMP. ECON. POLY 172, 173-79 (2006).
..
6 See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004 (July 9, 1986).
127 See Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (Dec. 22, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Policy on Incentives for
Self-Policing]; Allison F. Gardner, Beyond Compliance: Regulatory Incentives to Implement
Environmental Management Systems, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 662, 676-77 (2003).
" Gardner, supra note 127, at 662, 676-77.
1 Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Vio-
lations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618 (Apr. 11, 2000) [hereinafter 2000 Policy on Incentives for
Self-Policing].
130 Id. at 19,620.
131 Id. at 19,625.
132 Id.
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the defendant from non-compliance with environmental regulation. 133
Criminal penalties are also eligible for waiver if voluntarily disclosed
under the terms of the EPA's self-policing policy, although waiver of
criminal penalties is not limited solely to violations discovered through
systematic means. 3 1 In this regard, the 2000 policy is a change from the
1995 policy, under which only violations discovered through an environ-
mental audit or other systemic process and promptly disclosed and cor-
rected were eligible for waiver of criminal penalties. 35
The EPA's self-policing policy defines a "compliance management
system" as "encompass [ing] the regulated entity's documented systematic
efforts, appropriate to the size and nature of its business, to prevent,
detect and correct violations." 36 The "due diligence criteria" from the 1995
policy, which included but did not define the term "compliance manage-
ment system," are now included within the definition of "compliance
management system" in the 2000 policy. 37 The EPA policy does not specify
any particular standard to which a "compliance management system"
must adhere but does state:
Compliance management programs that train and moti-
vate employees to prevent, detect and correct violations on
a daily basis are a valuable complement to periodic audit-
ing. Where the violation is discovered through a compli-
ance management system and not through an audit, the
disclosing entity should be prepared to document how
its program reflects the due diligence criteria defined in
Section B of the Policy statement. These criteria, which
are adapted from existing codes of practice-such as
Chapter Eight of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for orga-
nizational defendants, effective since 1991-are flexible
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 1995 Policy on Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 127, at 66,711.
136 2000 Policy on Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 129, at 19,625.
137 See id. at 19,621 ("The revised Policy uses the term 'compliance management system'
instead of 'due diligence,' which was used in the 1995 Policy .... No substantive
difference is intended by substituting the term 'compliance management system' for 'due
diligence.'"); Gardner, supra note 127, at 677; see also Carr & Thomas, supra note 37, at
112-13 (discussing due diligence criteria of 1995 self-policing policy). Compare 1995 Policy
on Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 127, at 66,710-11 (describing due diligence
criteria) with 2000 Policy on Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 129, at 19,625
(defining "compliance management system").
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enough to accommodate different types and sizes of busi-
nesses and other regulated entities. The [EPA] recognizes
that a variety of compliance management programs are
feasible, and it will determine whether basic due diligence
criteria have been met in deciding whether to grant Audit
Policy credit. 3 '
A formal EMS established pursuant to a leading external stan-
dard such as ISO 14001 would appear to satisfy the formal requisites for
a "compliance management system" as defined by the EPA self-policing
policy.'39 Paulette Stenzel argues that "ISO 14001 certification, and main-
tenance of that certification, can be used to demonstrate that a company
has a compliance management program" which should, "[i]n turn, . . .
qualify the company for relief from gravity-based penalties resulting
from environmental laws violations."14 In an evaluation of the 1995
policy conducted by the EPA in 1999, "forty-three percent of the re-
sponding regulated entities reported that they implemented some" form
of EMS as a direct result of the policy, and fifty percent of others indi-
cated "that the Policy encouraged improvements to their [existing]
EMS."' 4 ' These survey results are somewhat limited in their empirical
value, however, because the sample group numbered only 50 entities.
142
Moreover, no data on the quality or comprehensiveness of the EMSs in
question was included as part of the survey.
141
Another factor that potentially encourages voluntary EMS adoption
among businesses is the strategic desire to promote a regulatory model of
industry "self-regulation" as an alternative to traditional environmental
regulation.'" Since the late 1980s advocates of "next generation" regulatory
138 2000 Policy on Incentives for Self-Policing, supra note 129, at 19,621.
139 Id.
140 Stenzel, supra note 11, at 266. See also 2000 Policy on Incentives for Self-Policing,
supra note 129, at 19,621; Bell, Modest Perspective, supra note 60, at 10,623 ("The ele-
ments of due diligence [in the 1995 audit policy] are consistent with the basic principles
of EMS, including ISO 14001.").
141 Gardner, supra note 127, at 681 (citing Evaluation of "Incentives for Self-Policing:
Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations" Policy Statement,
Proposed Revisions and Request for Public Comment, 64 Fed. Reg. 26,745 (May 17, 1999)).
142 Gardner, supra note 127, at 681-82.
" Id. at 682. For an analysis of the effect of the EPA's self-policing policy on compliance
behavior, see Sarah Stafford, Does Self-Policing Help the Environment? EPA's Audit
Policy and Hazardous Waste Compliance, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 16-21 (2005).
144 Stenzel, supra note 11, at 257-58; Andrews et al., supra note 10, at 41.
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reform have promoted the self-regulation concept which seeks exemptions
"from specific command-and-control requirements in lieu of industry
proposed alternative compliance plans often designed in collaboration with
government regulators and public interest groups."" In this regard,
heavily regulated industries and trade associations may have embraced
EMS approaches out of a desire to potentially "preempt more stringent
environmental regulation," as well as to encourage consideration of self-
regulation through formal EMSs as a viable alternative to government
regulation. 4 ' In addition, market pressures from consumers, customers,
and competitors, as well as social pressures, developed through
"environmental groups, citizens groups and the media," are cited as
potential influences on the decisions of firms to adopt formal EMSs as a
means of signaling environmentally responsible behavior to such
constituencies. 1
47
The EPA and state environmental agencies are also encouraging
voluntary EMS adoption by firms through voluntary initiatives and
creation of other incentives for EMS experimentation and research. 148
The EPA has issued multiple position statements committing to "pro-
mote the voluntary adoption of EMSs," including in 1998, 2002, and,
most recently, in February 2006.14 The most recent statement reflects
the EPA's vow to continue to "encourage widespread use of EMSs across
a range of organizations and settings, with particular emphasis on
adoption of EMSs to achieve improved environmental performance and
compliance, pollution prevention through source reduction, and continual
" Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 33,36. See also Steinzor, supra note 55, at 104.
14 NDEMS FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 94. See Coglianese & Nash, New Policy
Agenda, supra note 4, at 14-15; Stenzel, supra note 11, at 257-58.
147 NDEMS FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 95. See Andrews et al., supra note 10, at 47-
49; Stenzel, supra note 11, at 270-71; see also Pezzoli, supra note 56, at 354 ("Theories
developed within the framework of strategic management, organizational, and innovation
studies suggest that public pressures have been among the most important driving forces
for changes in firm behavior.").
" See NDEMS FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 94-95,276; Case, Regulatory Reform, supra
note 34, at 70-75; Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 10, at 73. For a listing of EMS initiatives
supported by the EPA, see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EMS INITIATIvEs SUPPORTED BY
EPA, http'//www.epa.gov/ems/initiatives/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
149 Position Statement on Environmental Management Systems (EMSs), 71 Fed. Reg.
5,664, at 5,665 (Feb. 2, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 EPA Position Statement]. See EPA
Position Statement on Environmental Management Systems and ISO 14001, 63 Fed. Reg.
12,094, 12,095 (Mar. 12, 1998); Gardner, supra note 127, at 674 n.51 (discussing 2002
EMS position statement which was not published in the Federal Register).
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improvement." 151 Significantly, the 2006 statement also emphasizes the
EPA's intent to "encourage the use of recognized environmental manage-
ment frameworks, such as the ISO 14001 Standard, as a basis for design-
ing and implementing EMSs that aim to achieve outcomes aligned with
the nation's environmental policy goals."' 5 '
Similarly, in April 2004, the EPA issued a report declaring the
agency's continuing commitment to participating in "informed experi-
mentation ... on the potential benefits and drawbacks of incorporating
EMSs into the regulatory structure."52 Regarding the potential for
incorporating EMSs into environmental regulatory strategy, the 2004
report states:
EPA will continue to promote the widespread adoption of
EMS, while exploring the potential value of linking EMSs
to regulatory structures--either in terms of improving the
regulatory structure, encouragiAg EMSs, or both. EPA is
interested in exploring the use of EMSs as an alternative
within the regulatory structure through careful experi-
mentation.... [However,] EPA has no intention of man-
dating the use of EMSs in rules and[/]or permits. Rather,
by looking at the possible consideration of EMSs within
regulatory structures, EPA is hoping to determine whether
drafting rules or permits to provide organizations that
choose to adopt EMSs with regulatory alternatives, options,
or benefits may lead to more effective and efficient regu-
lations. EPA will continue to explore the future of EMS
efforts within voluntary programs and will expand this
exploration to determine how and if these efforts should
extend into the regulatory arena. 
51
Previously, the EPA issued a major report in 1999 entitled Aiming for
Excellence: Actions to Encourage Stewardship and Accelerate Environmen-
tal Progress affirming the agency's commitment to significant evaluation
150 2006 EPA Position Statement, supra note 149, at 5,665.
151 Id.
152 EMS PERMITS AND REGULATIONS WORKGROUP, EPA's STRATEGY FOR DETERMINING TE
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and research efforts to determine how EMSs might be used to further
environmental policy.TM
A number of Clinton-era EPA regulatory "reinvention" programs
focused on testing and evaluation of formal EMSs, including Project XL,
the Common Sense Initiative, and the Environmental Leadership Program
("ELP"). 155 The purpose of the ELP, launched in June 1994, was to "test
innovative environmental management techniques and approaches,"'56
and was described by Clifford Rechtschaffen as "[tihe EPA's vehicle for
encouraging environmental management systems."5 ' The ELP has been
supplanted by the EPA's National Environmental Performance Track
initiative established in June 2000.158 The Performance Track initiative
draws on earlier EPA EMS-related programs, and seeks to encourage
firms to implement formal EMSs and obtain superior levels of environ-
mental performance in exchange for such benefits as public recognition
by the EPA as a leader in environmental compliance.'59
14 Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 70-71; EPA INNOVATION TASK FORCE, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 100-R-99-006, AIMING FOR EXCELLENCE: ACTIONS TO
ENCOURAGE STEWARDSHIP AND ACCELERATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS 12 (1999). For an
analysis of the entirety of the EPA's Aiming for Excellence report, see Case, Regulatory
Reform, supra note 34, at 59-89. For additional discussion of the implications of EMS
adoption on environmental policy, see Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Toward a
Management-Based Environmental Policy, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS?, supra note 4, at 222
[hereinafter Coglianese & Nash, Toward a Management-Based Environmental Policy].
155 Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 41.
154 Id. at 40-41.
157 Rechtschaffen, supra note 77, at 1,260.
See Program Description of the National Environmental Achievement Track, 65 Fed.
Reg. 41,655 (July 6, 2000); Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 15;
Gardner, supra note 127, at 689-90. For current information on the National Environ-
mental Performance Track, see Environmental Protection Agency, National Environmental
Performance Track, httpJ/www.epa.gov/performancetrack (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
'
59 Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 15; Gardner, supra note 127,
at 691-92. In a recent EPA news release, the Agency described overall benefits of the
Performance Track program as follows:
The benefits of Performance Track go beyond cleaner air, water, and
soil. First, Performance Track allows EPA and state regulators to maxi-
mize their resources, because members' demonstrated commitment to
environmental excellence, when combined with EPA's ongoing over-
sight, mean Performance Track facilities can be considered a lower
priority for routine inspections. Second, the recognition afforded to
Performance Track members shines a spotlight on each facility's envi-
ronmental performance, encouraging them to live up to and exceed
public expectations. Third, Performance Track members reach out to
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Notwithstanding the proliferation of such voluntary initiatives to
promote EMS adoption, there is an open question as to whether such
programs are inducing firms to adopt formal EMSs in significant num-
bers."6 A "relatively small proportion" of firms in the United States
participate in voluntary environmental initiatives. 161 Indeed, consistently
low participation rates in such initiatives have been a fundamental criti-
cism, contributing to a "perception that EPA voluntary programs are
largely insignificant and ultimately ineffectual." 16 2 As of August 2006, the
EPA reported that "more than 400" industrial facilities are participating in
the Performance Track." However, because such participants are "a self-
selected group" likely engaged in "beyond compliance" level environmental
performance prior to choosing to participate, the program may not be
inducing EMS adoption by firms not otherwise already inclined to do so.'"
III. INDUCING CORPORATE BEHAVIORAL CHANGE THROUGH THE
USE OF FORMAL EMSs
Policy approaches encouraging or mandating EMS adoption may
have the potential-to induce change in corporate environmental behavior
that will result in increased environmental protection. Cary Coglianese
their local communities to identify and respond to concerns and to keep
community members informed of their environmental performance.
Finally, Performance Track members regularly share their knowledge
and experience with other members and nonmembers, promoting the
wider adoption of environmental best practices.
Environmental Protection Agency, Performance Track Celebrates Five Years of
Environmental Leadership, http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/5th Anniversary.htm
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Performance Track Celebrates Five Years].
160 See Malloy, supra note 10, at 514 (observing that EPA EMS-based programs such as
Performance Track and StarTrack and a similar state program established in Oregon
appear "unlikely to produce widespread adoption of EMSs").
161 NDEMS FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at 93.
162 David W. Case, The EPA's HPV Challenge Program: A Tort Liability Trap, 62 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 147, 198 (2005) (discussing low participation rates for EPA voluntary
environmental initiatives and noting that"[s]uch minimal participation rates are among
explanations offered as to why past EPA voluntary programs disappoint both in terms
of results and impact.").
163 Performance Track Celebrates Five Years, supra note 159.
16 Gardner, supra note 127, at 692. See also Andrews et al., supra note 10, at 45, 57 n.7
(discussing participants in EPA supported National Environmental on Environmental
Management Systems research pilot project and reporting that "nearly two-thirds
reported [prior] participation in other voluntary environmental management incentive
programs" including prior EMS implementation).
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and Jennifer Nash characterize this as "management-based" environ-
mental regulatory strategy "used by those outside an organization to
change the management practices and behaviors of those on the inside."65
But, how does adopting a formal EMS potentially effectuate positive
change in corporate environmental behavior? Extant research on the role
of formal EMS adoption suggests that their impact on firm behavior "is
by no means assured or always significant."6 ' Indeed, the individual con-
ditions and circumstances under which firms design, implement, and
operate a formal EMS play a critical role in their potential success in
producing improved environmental performance.
6 7
In exploring the potential of formal EMS adoption to motivate
corporate environmental behavioral change, however, a recurrent theme
is the ability of such systems to generate information on a firm's environ-
mental impacts and performance. 8 Information has emerged as a
potential success story in the search for effective and efficient alterna-
tives to traditional environmental regulatory approaches.'69 Empirical
research, though limited, demonstrates that public information disclo-
sure can motivate environmental performance improvements by
regulated firms.7v Such "informational regulation" utilizes information
6 5 Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,005. See also
Malloy, supra note 10, at 460 (discussing "an alternative regulatory approach in which
the regulator directly intervenes in the management function, mandating or otherwise
encouraging the use of an environmental management system.").
' Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,004. See also
NDEMS FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at ES-25 (noting that because of their variability,
"[tihe existence or certification of an EMS per se does not necessarily provide any clear
information, or information comparable to other facilities, about the facility's actual
environmental performance, compliance, or rate of improvement.").
167 See NDEMS FNAL REPORT, supra note 64, at ES-25 to ES-27; Coglianese & Nash,
Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,004; Coglianese & Nash, New Policy
Agenda, supra note 4, at 16; Nash & Ehrenfeld, supra note 10, at 73-75. See generally
Andrews et al., supra note 10, at 35-43 (discussing theories of corporate behavior and
environmental performance).
See Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 16.
169 See Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 381; Vandenbergh,
New Era of Environmental Law, supra note 4, at 530.
170 See James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the
Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON & MGMT. 98 (1995); Madhu Khanna et
al., Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool for Environmental Protection, 36 J. ENVTL.
ECON & MGMT. 243 (1998); Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation:
the Effect of Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON &
MGMT. 109 (1997). For further discussion of these studies, see Case, Environmental
Information as Regulation, supra note 17, at 10,777-80.
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disclosure mechanisms to enlist the aid of social institutions such as
economic markets and public opinion to create incentives for firms to
engage in self-regulatory behavior."'7 In theory, post-disclosure pressures
brought to bear by these social institutions are a critical driver in induc-
ing positive change in corporate environmental behavior.'72 Thus, the
ability of formal EMSs to generate environmental performance infor-
mation has important implications for the use of such instruments to
motivate corporate behavioral change.
Many argue that significant and long-term improvement in a
firm's environmental performance requires change in organizational
structures and corporate culture.'73 Formal EMS development and im-
plementation is a substantial, organization-wide undertaking, especially
under leading external EMS standards.'74 This process can have a fun-
damentally transformative effect on a firm's organizational architecture
and culture.'75 Successful EMS implementation entails integrating en-
vironmental management issues into the company's existing internal
governance systems.' 6 Such organizational restructuring integrates
environmental considerations with all other primary corporate functions,
theoretically resulting in cultural change that will beneficially impact the
firm's environmental performance and outcomes.
Indeed, the very nature of EMS design and implementation is to
"embark on a prolonged and fundamental program[] of [organizational]
change."' Thus, a "fully operational" EMS is expected to "exert a
171 See Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 383. For additional
discussion of "informational regulation" in the environmental arena, see Case, Environ-
mental Information as Regulation, supra note 17; Mark A. Cohen, Information as a Policy
Instrument in Protecting the Environment: What Have We Learned?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,425 (2001); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO.
L.J. 257 (2001); Vandenberg, New Era of Environmental Law, supra note 4, at 529-33.
172 Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 383.
... Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 11.174 Id. at 11-12; John Moxen & Peter A. Strachan, ISO 14001: A Case of Cultural Myopia,
7 ECO-MGMT. & AUDITING 82, 86 (2000).
175 Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 11-12; Moxen & Strachan,
supra note 174, at 86.
176 Magali Delmas, Stakeholders and Competitive Advantage: The Case of ISO 14001, 10
PRODUCTION & OPERATIONS MGMT. 343, 346 (2001). See also Andrews et al., supra note
10, at 39 (discussing arguments for "increased integration of environmental consider-
ations throughout... corporate management incentive systems.").
177 Delmas, supra note 176, at 346.
7
' Moxen & Strachan, supra note 174, at 86.
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powerful influence" over the perceptions, actions and decision-making of
managers and employees. 179 However, such a profound impact on the
organization is more likely to occur if employees at all levels, from top
management to front line workers, are involved in design and implemen-
tation of the EMS. 80
As emphasized in Part II, a formal EMS requires upper man-
agement to develop an environmental policy to guide implementation
and operation of the system.' The policy guides identification of the
organization's environmental impacts and determination of environ-
mental goals and objectives.'82 This process may create new or increased
environmental awareness and comprehension at the highest levels of the
organization, and "instill new ways of thinking" about environmental
impacts by top-level management.1 3 Commentators caution, however,
that the attitude or commitment that managers bring to environmental
management concerns ex ante may strongly influence the potential effec-
tiveness of formal EMSs in improving a firm's environmental perfor-
mance.M Said another way, the existing attitudes and commitments of
firm managers towards environmental concerns may well be an inde-
pendent variable affecting the ability of formal EMSs to induce positive
corporate behavioral change.'85
Nonetheless, the ability to involve employees at all levels in EMS
design, implementation, and operation potentially has organization-wide
implications for corporate behavior.' Such universal employee involve-
ment increases environmental awareness firm-wide, which may positively
influence actions and decision-making at all levels of the organization. 187
Further, leading EMS standards such as ISO 14001 require substantial
and ongoing "programs for training, awareness and competence among
179 Id. at 85.
180 Delmas, supra note 176, at 346.
181 See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
1
8 2 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
183 Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 12.
184 Id. at 18 ("Firms that volunteer to adopt an EMS do so because of some preexisting
commitment to improving their environmental performance and therefore are less likely
to implement these systems merely in token ways."); Coglianese & Nash, Management-
Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,007-08; GUNNINGHAM ETAL., supra note 47, at 96-97.
185 See Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,007-08;
Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 17-18.
186 See Delmas, supra note 176, at 346.
187 Id.
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all employees."' Such programs will further "increase awareness of
environmental impacts of operations among all employees,"8 9 and focus
firm-wide attention toward opportunities for environmental performance
improvement.9
As emphasized above, the linchpin to the ability of formal EMS
adoption to change corporate environmental behavior is the information
that such management systems generate.' 9' Commentators observe that
information generated through EMSs has the potential to change cor-
porate behavior by "providing feedback directly to decisionmakers" re-
garding opportunities to reduce environmental impacts and risks.'92 As
Shelley Metzenbaum emphasizes, "[i]f the information gets distributed
to people who can and will do something about it, then environmental
feedback information can improve the organization's environmental
performance. ""' Further, information generated through EMSs can be
disseminated to external stakeholders who then influence the behavior
of corporate decisionmakers by bringing to bear post-disclosure public
and market-based pressures. 94
"Management-based" environmental regulatory strategies require
firms and their managers to "invest in information gathering."' 95 Firms
may lack adequate incentives to gather information necessary to identify
opportunities to improve environmental performance." Leading external
EMS standards, however, require firms to collect copious amounts of
information and to generate and maintain records as part of ongoing
environmental management processes. 7 This investment in the gener-
ation of information on environmental impacts, risks, and performance
alternatives is the "key" to internal, management-directed corporate
's Morrow & Rondinelli, supra note 61, at 162.
18 9 Id. at 163.
190 Id.
191 See Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,009;
Shelley H. Metzenbaum, Information, Environmental Performance, and Environmental
Management Systems, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS?, supra note 4, at 146, 156-59.
192 Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,009.
193 Metzenbaum, supra note 191, at 155.




97 WILSON & SASSEVILLE, supra note 57, at 119-21, 128-29; Morrow & Rondinelli, supra
note 61, at 162.
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behavioral change. 9 ' Indeed, "knowledge of any environmental problem
is a necessary condition for managers to find a solution."'99
Moreover, even in the absence of evidence that EMSs improve
environmental outcomes, policymakers may nonetheless want to en-
courage firms to adopt EMSs because of the ability of such systems to
generate "credible and comparable environmental performance infor-
mation." 00 Considerable policy benefits can occur if such information is
disseminated to third parties, such as workers, consumers, shareholders,
regulators, and the general public.' °' Public disclosure of comparable
environmental performance data has the potential to encourage corpo-
rate environmental behavioral change through "a multilayered, mutually
reinforcing system of internal and external performance monitoring and
benchmarking."'0 ' In a seminal Georgetown Law Journal article on en-
vironmental informational regulation, Bradley Karkkainen emphasized
that the informal monitoring regime triggered by public information
disclosure imposes diverse forms of social and market-based pressure on
corporate environmental behavior.'0 ' This informal regime includes self-
monitoring from firm managers and external monitoring performed by
industry competitors, government regulators, local communities, and
economic markets. °4
Significantly, however, EMSs do not necessarily require public
disclosure of information relative to the firm's environmental perfor-
mance.'0 5 For example the leading external EMS standard, ISO 14001,
requires disclosure of the firm's written environmental policy, but no other
environmental performance information must be publicly disclosed.2 6
Nonetheless, linkages between formal EMSs and corporate environ-
mental information disclosure mechanisms are encouraged by some EMS
standards and guidelines.
For example, the EU's EMAS regulation mandates extensive
public environmental performance reporting."' Although implementation
198 Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,009.
199 Id.
200 Metzenbaum, supra note 191, at 159.
201 Id.
202 Case, Environmental Information as Regulation, supra note 17, at 10,785.
20 Karkkainen, supra note 171, at 261-62.
204 Id. at 261,295-97,309-12,316,323-27; Case, Environmental Information as Regulation,
supra note 17, at 10,785-86.
205 Coglianese & Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 6.
21 Id.; Rechtschaffen, supra note 77, at 1,263; Morrow & Rondinelli, supra note 61, at 162.
207 See Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 404-07 (describing
public environmental information reporting requirements of EMAS regulation).
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of a formal EMS is a core element of participation, the EMAS is pri-
marily "an information disclosure-based system designed to promote
transparency in the environmental operations and performance of par-
ticipating businesses."2 °s Indeed, the "prime objective" of EMAS is public
environmental performance information disclosure, which is primarily
achieved through the mandatory preparation of a formal corporate en-
vironmental report. 20 9 Further, environmental management principles
and guidelines created by some non-governmental environmental orga-
nizations, most notably GEMI, CERES, and the ICC, also call for periodic
reporting of information to the public as part of an overall environmental
management strategy.210
Similar to the trend toward formal EMS adoption, the practice of
voluntary disclosure of environmental performance information by firms
through publicly available formal corporate environmental reports has
gained considerable momentum over the last two decades. 21' And, some-
what analogous to the growth of EMS adoption adhering to the ISO
14001 standard, the practice of voluntary environmental reporting is wit-
nessing an ambitious standardization movement through the Amsterdam-
based non-profit Global Reporting Initiative." 2 Regulatory approaches
that link these two instruments, as is the case with the EMAS regulation,
embrace a "reflexive environmental law" philosophy.213 Indeed, environ-
mental information disclosure mechanisms and environmental manage-
ment systems are each included within a "family of legal instruments
that reflect an emerging... 'reflexive law' conception of regulation."214
Reflexive law theory argues that complex social problems caused
or exacerbated by business activities are often beyond the capacity of
legal institutions alone to satisfactorily resolve.215 Michael Vandenbergh
observes that "[piroponents of reflexive environmental law assert that
the complexity of environmental problems undermines both command
208 Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 73.
209 Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 404.
210 Id. at 396-97.
211 See id. at 394-401 (describing evolution of voluntary regime of formal corporate envi-
ronmental reporting since the late 1980s and early 1990s).212 Id. at 397-401.
213 For a general discussion of the concept of "reflexive environmental law" see Case,
Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 427-30; Orts, supra note 69, at
1,252-68; Vandenbergh, New Era of Environmental Law, supra note 3, at 532-33.
214 Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 21, 127, 133 (2001).
215 Orts, supra note 69, at 1,313.
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and control and market mechanisms as regulatory tools."21 Thus, "fun-
damental structural change in the everyday life of business institutions"
is necessary to overcome the limitations of traditional regulatory methods
to induce socially desirable behavior. 17 Reflexive law strategies seek to
shift regulatory efforts away from direct regulation of firm behavior
towards creation of structural processes that promote self-regulatory
behavior.218 These structural processes are intended to stimulate commu-
nication between firms and societal stakeholders creating incentives for
corporate internalization of important societal norms.1 9
Environmentally beneficial management practices, such as the
adoption of formal EMSs, play an important role in a reflexive environ-
mental law strategy.220 However, the most critical component influencing
the potential effectiveness of a reflexive environmental law strategy is
the generation and public disclosure of appropriate information.22' With-
out sufficient information, communication between the organization and
societal stakeholders about appropriate norms of corporate environ-
mental behavior cannot occur.222 Absent such communication, societal
environmental goals are not internalized by corporate actors and thus
integrated into corporate decision-making.223 Ultimately, the primary
objective of reflexive environmental law approaches, the "transformation
of business culture," will not take place.224 Thus, reflexive environmental
law theory strongly suggests that to effectuate positive corporate envi-
ronmental behavioral change, public information disclosure mechanisms
must be incorporated within formal EMS standards.
218 Vandenbergh, New Era of Environmental Law, supra note 4, at 533.
217 Orts, supra note 69, at 1,313.
218 Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2,029,
2,040 n.50 (2005); Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 428-29.
219 Stewart, supra note 214, at 127-29.
2201 d. at 133; Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 429. See also
Malloy, supra note 10, at 495 ([An EMS can explicitly focus managers' and other
workers' attention on understanding how different activities affect compliance and on
how the firm processes information and makes decisions. This is the 'reflexive' value of
the EMS: increasing communication and reflection within the firm concerning environ-
mental responsibilities.").
221 Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 429. See also Stewart, supra
note 214, at 134-43 ("The procedural and structural role of government under a theory of
reflexive law has many aspects, but the simplest level is to ensure individuals have infor-
mation about the environmental performance of organizations: external transparency.").
222 Stewart, supra note 214, at 134-35.
223 Id.
224 Orts, supra note 69, at 1,313.
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Since the late 1990s, a substantial push in the public and private
sectors has been underway to evaluate whether formal EMSs are posi-
tively correlated with improved corporate environmental performance.225
Although significant research has been conducted to date, the research
agenda related to EMSs and management-based regulatory strategies is
still in its relative infancy.2 s Nonetheless, initial indications are quite
positive that implementation of formal EMSs and increased focus on
management-based regulatory strategies are associated with improve-
ments in environmental performance by firms.
.The most ambitious research study to date has been the National
Database on Environmental Management Systems ("NDEMS"), a joint
venture between the EPA, the University of North Carolina, the Multi-
State Working Group on Environmental Management Systems, and the
Environmental Law Institute.227 The NDEMS project was launched in
connection with the EPA's 1999 Aiming for Excellence report.22 The
primary purpose of the NDEMS study was to consider the effects of EMS
implementation on environmental and economic performance of firms.229
The study involved eighty-three facilities in seventeen U.S. states and
was the first to "collect longitudinal, real-time, facility-level comparative
data on performance changes associated with EMS introduction."230
The University of North Carolina issued a comprehensive final
report on the NDEMS in January 2003.23' The report emphasizes signif-
icant limitations of the study, most notably the small sample size and the
fact that participating facilities were a self-selected group.232 Nonethe-
less, the report concludes that the overall evidence suggests that EMS
implementation "is associated with improvements in environmental per-
formance."23 3 Other recent empirical studies on the effect of EMS-based
strategies on the environmental performance of firms indicate that such
225 See Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 71-72 (describing research and
evaluation activities supported by EPA and others).
226 See Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,003-14
(summarizing research presented at 2003 conference organized by the Regulatory Policy
Program at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and observing that management-
based regulatory strategies are "relatively new and unstudied").
227 See Case, Regulatory Reform, supra note 34, at 71-72.
228 Id. at 5, 71-72.
229 NDEMS FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at ES-2.
230 id. at ES-2, ES-3.
231 Id. at title page.
232 Id. at ES-24.
mId. at ES-4.
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strategies often, though not always, produce "clearly positive" results.2"
However, regarding the future of utilizing EMSs as an environmental
regulatory policy tool, scholars emphasize that considerable further re-
search is necessary to determine under what circumstances such systems
contribute to improved environmental performance." 5 Significantly, the
final NDEMS report identifies systematic study of the "relationships
between environmental performance outcomes and public reporting on
environmental performance indicators" as an important component of a
future EMS research agenda.236
CONCLUSION
The continuing public policy debate over strategies to improve the
effectiveness of the existing environmental regulatory regime benefits
from increased focus on the internal management practices of firms. The
results of major research efforts such as the NDEMS provide grounds for
optimism that formal EMSs have value as public policy tools for achieving
234 Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,008-09 (sum-
marizing results of empirical studies on EMS implementation and management-based
strategies). See Ulrich Steger, Environmental Management Systems: Empirical Evidence
and Further Perspectives, 18 EuR. MGMT. J. 23, 26, 33-37 (2000) (concluding positive
results on environmental compliance from review oftwo dozen separate empirical studies
of EMS performance).
235 See NDEMS FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at ES-28 to ES-30 (describing the future
research agenda for evaluating links between EMSs and corporate environmental perfor-
mance); Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,011 ("A
key challenge in the development of management-based approaches to environmental
policy will be to identify which [policy] design elements, or which combinations of these
elements, yield the most successful outcomes under specific conditions."); Coglianese &
Nash, New Policy Agenda, supra note 4, at 16 ("When it comes to crafting public policy
with EMSs in mind, it is important to know which... explanatory factors contribute
most to improved environmental performance and under what circumstances they do.").
Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash further emphasize that:
[E]xisting research cannot yet discern whether the implementation of
an EMS is itself a necessary or sufficient condition for real environ-
mental improvement. Much of what we currently know about EMSs
has been drawn from close study of organizations that have strong
environmental programs. Researchers understand less well how the
managers of more typical firms-or even firms that are atypical in their
disregard for the environment-use EMSs.
Coglianese & Nash, Toward a Management-Based Environmental Policy, supra note 154,
at 228.236 NDEMS FINAL REPORT, supra note 64, at ES-28.
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environmental protection goals. Regulatory strategies encouraging or
mandating EMS adoption may positively impact corporate behavior by
improving compliance rates as well as reducing non-regulated environ-
mental impacts and risks of firm activities. Indeed, some research findings
suggest that EMS-based strategies may be more effective in improving
non-regulated impacts of corporate environmental behavior than those
already the subject of conventional regulation.237
In theory, the realignment of organizational structures and cul-
ture in order to focus more specifically on environmental concerns will
result in behavioral change through increased awareness of environ-
mental impacts. This enhanced knowledge base will potentially lead to
more effective organizational decision-making regarding environmental
performance and outcomes. Perhaps the most significant potential driver
of corporate environmental behavioral change, however, may be the op-
portunity to link the substantial information-generating capabilities of
formal EMSs with public information disclosure mechanisms. Indeed, the
potential for EMSs to produce environmental performance data that
companies would not otherwise generate has important implications for
policymakers interested in expanding the use of informational regulation
as an environmental protection policy tool.
23 8
However, the promise of an EMS-based approach to environ-
mental regulatory reform should not be overblown. Not nearly enough is
known about potential causal links between formal EMS implementation
and corporate environmental performance improvement, or whether the
social benefits of EMS-based strategies would exceed their social costs.
Continued empirical research is needed to narrow the determinants of
when EMS-based strategies are more apt to work effectively and effi-
ciently and when they are not. An EMS-based regulatory strategy is un-
likely to ever be a feasible substitute for direct legal controls on corporate
environmental behavior. However, understanding which circumstances
and problems are optimal for use of EMS-based approaches would allow
development of targeted strategies to complement direct control systems
and attendant enforcement regimes. As part of a reflexive law strategy,
a primary objective of EMS-based approaches should be to encourage
self-regulatory corporate behavior to supplement, rather than substitute
for, traditional environmental regulation.
27 See Coglianese & Nash, Management-Based Strategies, supra note 11, at 10,012.8 See Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 381-87.
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To this point, the trend of formal EMS adoption by firms has
evolved within a voluntary regime. The EPA's current position is that the
potential public policy value of EMSs should be considered solely from
the standpoint of incentives to encourage voluntary EMS adoption by
firms.2 39 There has been considerable dialogue among scholars over the
merits of voluntary versus mandatory approaches to environmental regu-
latory reform efforts. 240 Depending on the context, both approaches have
relative strengths and weaknesses. 24 1 However, the EPA's apparently
single-minded focus on voluntary, incentive-based policy approaches to
EMSs, while perhaps more politically palatable, is short-sighted.
While incentive-based EMS programs are of significant value, a
mandatory approach to EMS implementation in certain circumstances
may offer advantages over voluntary programs.242 As noted in Part II
above, participation rates by firms in voluntary environmental initiatives
are consistently low.24 3 Thus, incentive-based systems have been unable
to secure widespread participation within targeted industry sectors. 24
To the extent that an EMS-based approach would produce significant
increases in environmental protection in certain circumstances, a vol-
untary program may significantly under-produce environmental policy
benefits. A mandatory program, on the other hand, could specifically
target a particular population of firms for which policymakers view
formal EMS implementation to serve important public policy goals.245
239 See EMS PERMITS AND REGULATIONS WORKGROUP, supra note 152, at 1-3.
240 See Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 439 (noting differing
views regarding voluntary corporate environmental reporting regimes and mandatory
information disclosure); Sonja Gallhofer &Jim Haslam, The Direction of Green Accounting
Policy: Critical Reflections, 10 ACCT., AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 148, 149-65 (1997)
(contrasting views supporting a voluntary approach to environmental reporting to a
critical theoreticaljustification for an interventionist regulatory approach); Malloy, supra
note 10, at 511-23 (comparing relative strengths and weaknesses of incentive-based and
mandatory EMS approaches); Josephine Maltby, Setting Its Own Standards and Meeting
Those Standards: Voluntarism Versus Regulation in Environmental Reporting, 6 BUS.
STRATEGY & THE ENV'T 83, 89-91 (1997).
241 See Malloy, supra note 10, at 512.
242 See id. at 511-23.
24S See supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
244 See Malloy, supra note 10, at 513-16 (discussing the problem of inadequate incentives
to secure industry participation in voluntary EMS-based initiatives).
245 See id. at 519 ("Compared to incentive-based programs, a mandatory program has sig-
nificantly greater capacity to determine the population of firms pulled within its orbit.").
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Moreover, to the extent that linking formal EMS adoption with
public information disclosure mechanisms is deemed important to maxi-
mizing the potential of management-based regulatory strategies to foster
positive corporate behavioral change, the "under-inclusiveness problem"
inherent in voluntary programs may become even more pronounced.246
Participation rates by firms in voluntary environmental information dis-
closure initiatives have been "disturbingly low."24 ' Thus, notwithstanding
the public policy benefits that could result from such disclosure, firms
may be less likely to voluntarily participate in incentive-based EMS
programs if significant formal public information disclosure is required.
Again, a mandatory regulatory strategy would overcome the many dis-
incentives firms may have to voluntarily implement formal EMSs requir-
ing public environmental performance information disclosure.2" Indeed,
legal mandates, rather than market forces or voluntary self-regulatory
behavior, are often the most important motivation underlying corporate
environmental behavior.249 Thus, future evaluation of the potential public
policy value of EMSs should include research related to and experimen-
tation with mandatory approaches.
I
6 id.
Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting, supra note 2, at 439.
4See id. at 439-42 (discussing the factors that contribute to underproduction of the public
good of information justifying government intervention in the form of mandatory dis-
closure laws).
'
9 Andrea Ross & Jeremy Rowan-Robinson, It's Good to Talk! Environmental Information
and the Greening of Industry, 40 J. ENVTL. PLAN. & MGMT. 111, 113 (1997). See also supra
notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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